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I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article focuses on the interpretations of, and changes relating
to, oil, gas, and mineral law in Texas from November 2, 2005,
through November 1, 2006. The cases examined include decisions
of state and federal courts in the State of Texas and the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals.'
II. CONVEYANCING
In Arias v. Kerlin,2 the parties litigated the title to Padre Island. While
the case does not directly involve any oil and gas issue, it is an important
title decision for titles originating when the United States contested Mex-
ican sovereignty. Descendants of Padre Balli claimed that in 1999 they
discovered that an 1847 "Tutor's Deed" was fraudulent and ineffective to
convey title because one of the children named in the deed as grantor,
Jesus Balli, was twenty-two years old and married at the time of the con-
veyance. Because Jesus Balli was not a minor, his father could not law-
fully enter into a deed on behalf of Jesus Balli. The defendant, Kerlin,
filed a motion for summary judgment on multiple grounds, which the trial
court granted, but, on appeal, was reversed and remanded. 3
The Tutor's Deed was signed on March 17, 1847, in Matamoros, Mex-
ico, and confirmed by a Mexican court decree. "However, by late 1845,
Texas had joined the United States, and American soldiers began occupa-
tion of the border area, including Padre Island, while the exact boundary
* Attorney at Law, Brown & Fortunato, P.C., Amarillo, Texas (www.bf-law.com).
1. This Article is devoted exclusively to Texas law. Cases involving questions of oil,
gas, and mineral law decided by courts sitting in Texas but applying laws of other states are
not included.
2. No. 13-03-364-CV, 2006 WL 20778 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Jan. 5, 2006, pet.
filed).
3. Id. at *1.
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between Texas and Mexico remained in dispute."' 4 The parties agreed
that, under Mexican law at the time, a male remained a minor until he
either reached the age of twenty-five or married, but, under American
law at the same time, a male became an adult at twenty-one.5 Therefore,
one of the critical questions was which law applied. The court of appeals
referred to case law for the general rule that title granted by the Mexican
government on or before December 19, 1836, is good, and Mexican au-
thority to grant lands in Texas north or east of the Rio Grande ended
with the signing of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on May 30, 1848.
Title to land in Texas that the Mexican government acknowledged after
December 19, 1836, is not given automatic recognition.6
Kerlin cited Martin v. Weyman 7 to argue that jurisdiction of the Mexi-
can State of Tamaulipas over the premises in dispute did not cease until
May 30, 1848. Martin confirmed Mexican authority over a disputed bor-
der tract in which Mexico retained de facto jurisdiction. The court of ap-
peals construed Martin as standing for the premise that determining
which country held de facto jurisdiction is a fact question to be resolved
on a case-by-case basis, and, in this case, there was some evidence that
American troops had been occupying Padre Island since 1845.8 The court
of appeals found that "Texas courts have held the Mexican government
was divested of its jurisdiction over the disputed area possibly as early as
1836 and at least by 1845 or 1848," and, therefore, "the Mexican court
affirming the transfer of Padre Island in 1847 was most likely without
jurisdiction over the property involved." 9 Moreover, because Kerlin had
not provided sufficient evidence that the Mexican government retained
jurisdiction, summary judgment was improper. 10
Any holding that determines the applicable law based on the status of
troop deployments from 160 years ago presents obvious problems of
proof and introduces uncertainty into land titles. It works against Kerlin
in this case because, to prevail, he must show that Mexico did in fact
retain jurisdiction over Padre Island in 1847.
In Garcia v. Garcia," the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that a
deed's general grant of "all" is not limited by a more specific description
included in the deed. The grantor owned eighteen surface acres and an
undivided 60.2395 oil-gas-and-other-mineral acres. The deed conveyed
the following:
All that certain lot, tract or parcel of land, situated in the County of
Zapata, State of Texas, more particularly described as follows, to-wit:
4. Id. at *3.
5. Id. at *2.
6. Id. at *3.
7. 26 Tex. 460, 465 (Tex. 1863).
8. Arias, 2006 WL 20778, at *3.
9. Id. at *4.
10. Id.
11. No. 04-05-00538-CV, 2006 WL 1684742 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Jun. 21, 2006,
pet. denied).
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Eighteen (18) acres of land, more or less, undivided, being all out
[sic] right, title and interest in and to 891.30 acres of land, more or
less, in Porclones Nos. 34 and 35, Zapata County, Texas
... in this connection it is the intention of the Grantors herein to sell
and convey to the Grantee herein all interest of every kind and char-
acter, and from whatever source acquired, in and to said entire
891.3 acre tract. 12
The court of appeals held that the deed was unambiguous and con-
veyed all of grantor's interest. 13 The court of appeals relied on existing
authority14 for the principle that a broad, general granting clause that is a
conveyance of "all" of the grantor's interest will broaden a more specific,
limited description. The court of appeals found that the description's fi-
nal clause was conclusive and that the rule of construction that the spe-
cific controls over the general only applies when there is a conflict or
repugnance between the descriptions used. 15 In this deed, there was no
conflict, and "situations in which general grants cannot be given effect
have not arisen frequently," and "it only rarely happens that general
grants cannot be given literal effect."'16
In Garza v. Prolithic Energy Co., L.P.,' 7 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals analyzed two deeds raising the issues of (1) the mineral-royalty dis-
tinction and (2) the conflicting fractions and the "two-grant theory." The
deed forms at issue were the three-paragraph forms commonly used in
the 1930s and 1940s that included a granting clause, a "subject to" clause,
and a "future lease" clause.18 One of the deeds was to Claypool and
denominated as a "Royalty Contract," and the second was to Lee and
denominated a "Mineral Deed." The text used in the two forms was very
similar. As a general rule, the name given to an instrument is not given
controlling effect. The court of appeals disregarded the names, reached
the same result favoring the grantees as to both deeds, and found that the
interests conveyed were mineral interests. 19 The Royalty Contract in-
cluded in pertinent part the following three clauses:
1. In the granting clause, the Royalty Contract provided: "[A]n un-
divided one-half (1/2) interest in and to all the oil, gas, and other
minerals in and under the [Property] .... Together with the rights of
ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of taking said
minerals." 20
12. Id. at *1.
13. Id. at *4.
14. See Holloway's Unknown Heirs v. Whatley, 131 S.W.2d 89, 91-92 (Tex. 1939); Sun
Oil Co. v. Burns, 84 S.W.2d 442, 444 (Tex. 1935); Katz v. Bakke, 265 S.W.2d 686, 687 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1954, writ ref'd).
15. Garcia, 2006 WL 1684742, at *3.
16. Id. at *4.
17. 195 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
18. Id. at 145.




2. In the "subject to" clause, the Royalty Contract provided: "It is
distinctly understood and herein stipulated that said land is under an
Oil and Gas Lease made by Grantor providing for a royalty of 1/8th
of the oil and certain royalties or rentals for gas and other minerals
and that Grantor herein shall receive One-half (1/2) of the royalties
and rentals provided for in said lease insofar only as said lease covers
the land hereinabove described; but he shall have no part of the an-
nual rentals paid to keep said lease in force until drilling has
begun. 21
3. In the "future lease" clause, the Royalty Contract provided: "It
is further agreed that Grantee shall have no interest in any bonus
money received by the Grantor in any future lease or leases given on
said land, and that it shall not be necessary for the grantee to join in
any such lease or leases so made; That Grantee shall receive under
such lease or leases one-sixteenth (1/16th) part of all oil, gas and
other minerals taken and saved under such lease or leases, and he
shall receive the same out of the royalty provided for in such lease or
leases, but Grantee shall have no part in the annual rentals paid to
keep such lease or leases in force until drilling is begun.22
The warranty clause in the Royalty Contract warranted "all and singular
the said minerals . "23 The controversy arose in the usual manner: the
existing one-eighth royalty lease terminated, and a new one-fifth royalty
lease replaced it.24
The first issue was to resolve whether the interest conveyed was a min-
eral interest or a royalty. Grantee asserted that it was a mineral interest;
therefore, Grantee was entitled to one-half of one-fifth of production.
Grantor asserted that the interest conveyed was a fixed royalty of one-
sixteenth of production.25 Analysis of the mineral-royalty distinction al-
ways begins with Altman v. Blake,26 which defines the five essential at-
tributes of a severed mineral estate as: (1) the right to develop (the right
of ingress and egress); (2) the right to lease (the executive right); (3) the
right to receive bonus payments; (4) the right to receive delay rents; and
(5) the right to receive royalty payments. Subsequent authority holds
that the parties may choose whether to grant or reserve each of the attrib-
utes, and a "bare" mineral right stripped of all attributes except the right
to receive royalty is, nevertheless, still a mineral interest. 27 The reasoning
is that carving out such rights is redundant and would be unnecessary if
the instrument in question was intended to be a royalty deed. The court
of appeals reasoned that this "Royalty Contract" was a mineral deed be-
cause it reserved in grantors at least the second, third, and fourth attrib-
21. Id.
22. Id. at 139-40.
23. Id. at 140.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 141.
26. 712 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. 1986).
27. Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 142; see French v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 896 S.W.2d 795, 796
(Tex. 1995).
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utes (and possibly the first) of a mineral interest. The court of appeals
also gave weight to the use of the words "in and under" in the granting
clause, which usually refers to a mineral interest.2 8 The court of appeals
found for the grantees but was silent as to the reference in the warranty
clause to "the said minerals, '29 which was one of the points urged by the
Claypool-Lee grantees. 30
The Mineral Deed to Lee was similar, except that the interest conveyed
was 15/32 rather than one-half, and the "future lease" clause required a
lease with a royalty of at least "the usual one-eighth" and "Grantee shall
receive under such lease or leases 15/32 of 1/8 part .... "31 The court of
appeals held that both deeds conveyed a mineral interest 32 and then
turned to the second question, which was to resolve conflicting fractions.
The Claypool-Lee grantees claimed that they were entitled to one-half
of one-fifth and 15/32 of one-fifth, respectively. The successors to the
grantor claimed that Claypool should get the "fixed royalty" of one-six-
teenth and that Lee should get 15/32 of one-eighth. The successors to the
grantors conceded that the granting clause conveyed a mineral interest
but contended that, upon execution of the new lease, a portion of the
royalty effectively reverted back to them. The court of appeals went
through a tortured analysis of difficult cases constraining three-grant
forms and chose to rule on the basis of a broad "four-corners" analysis. 33
It acknowledged the reasons behind the development of the three-grant
form, the typical royalty of one-eighth when the Royalty Contract and
Mineral Deed were executed, and noted that there was nothing in those
two conveyances that made it evident that two differing estates were be-
ing conveyed. The conveyances could be harmonized by holding that the
grantees were to consistently receive a one-half and 15/32 interest, re-
spectively, of whatever amount of royalty was paid under the future-lease
clause.34 The court of appeals bolstered its conclusion by referring to the
Mineral Deed, which clearly contemplated that future leases might have a
royalty greater than one-eighth, but Lee would share in 15/32 of one-
eighth under leases containing the "usual one-eighth. ' 35 Logically, a
greater royalty would result in a greater interest to Lee. 36
It would be hard to say which phrase is more hated by title examiners:
"two-grant theory" or "surface-destruction test." The Garza court faced
a difficult task in rationalizing cases construing these three-grant forms.
The Garza result is probably a good one. When these forms were being
used, royalties were almost always one-eighth, and it would be a very
28. Garza, 195 S.W.3d at 142.
29. Id. at 137.
30. Id. at 147.
31. Id. at 140.
32. Id. at 142-43.
33. Id. at 143-45.
34. Id. at 145-46.




unusual and very creative grantor who actually intended two separate
grants of differing interests.
In Ramirez v. Flores,37 the San Antonio Court of Appeals considered
the reformation of a deed. Ramirez agreed to sell the surface and one-
sixteenth of the mineral estate in certain land to Flores. After the sale
closed, Ramirez discovered that the title company made a mistake, and
that the deed transferred the surface estate and the entire mineral estate
to Flores. Flores refused to correct the error.38
A party is entitled to reformation of a deed when it can prove that it
reached an agreement with the other party, but the deed contains a mu-
tual mistake and does not accurately reflect the agreement that the par-
ties entered into.39 A mutual mistake is "one common to both or all
parties, wherein each labors under the same misconception respecting a
material fact, the terms of the agreement, or provision of a written instru-
ment designed to embody such an agreement. ' 40 It is well established in
Texas that a scrivener's failure to embody the true agreement of the par-
ties in a written instrument is a "mistake" that is grounds for reformation
on the basis of mutual mistake. 41
A senior escrow agent for the title company testified about the parties'
agreement at trial. She stated that the earnest money contract reflected
that Ramirez agreed to convey the surface estate and one-sixteenth of the
mineral estate to Flores. She also testified that, due to an oversight, the
attorney preparing the deed was not furnished a copy of the earnest
money contract, thus the warranty deed was erroneously drafted. Rami-
rez testified that the parties had not entered into subsequent agreements
to alter or change the agreed upon terms of the earnest money contract.
Flores testified that the warranty deed was consistent with an oral agree-
ment reached between the parties after the earnest money contract was
executed. 42
The signed earnest money contract provided: "This contract contains
the entire agreement of the parties and cannot be changed except by their
written agreement. ' 43 Texas law generally permits a written contract that
is not required to be in writing to be modified by a subsequent oral agree-
ment, even if the contract includes a clause prohibiting oral modifica-
tions.44 However, the earnest money contract that Ramirez and Flores
entered into could not be modified by a subsequent oral agreement be-
37. No. 04-05-0075-CV, 2006 WL 927295 (Tex. App.-San Antonio April 12, 2006, no
pet.).
38. Id. at *1.
39. Thalman v. Martin, 635 S.W.2d 411, 413 (Tex. 1982).
40. Allen v. Berrey, 645 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
41. Ramirez, 2006 WL 927295, at *2.
42. Id. at *2-3.
43. Id. at *4.
44. Hyatt Check Builders-Engineers Co. v. Bd. of Regents, 607 S.W.2d 258, 265 (Tex.
App.-Texarkana 1980, writ dism'd).
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cause the law required that it be in writing.45 After reviewing the evi-
dence, the court of appeals held that Ramirez was entitled to reformation
of the warranty deed as a matter of law. 46
In Stewman Ranch, Inc. v. Double M. Ranch, Ltd.,47 the Eastland
Court of Appeals construed a deed reservation to determine whether it
reserved one-half of the royalty in "the described lands" or only one-half
of the royalty that the grantors then owned. Grantors did not own 100%
of the royalty interests conveyed in the deed. Instead, they owned undi-
vided interests of varying amounts under the several tracts conveyed. 48
The deed contained the following reservation:
There is, however, excepted and reserved to the Grantors an undi-
vided one-half (1/2) of the royalties to be paid on the production of
oil, gas, and other hydrocarbons from the described lands which are
presently owned by Grantors .... 49
Grantors argued that the reservation was for one-half of the total roy-
alties from the described lands, which, as to some tracts, would zero out
the grantees because grantors did not even own one-half in certain tracts
when conveyed. 50 Grantors contended that they should win under the
established rules distinguishing between reservations in the lands "con-
veyed" (which reserve a fraction of the mineral estate conveyed 51) and
reservations in the lands "described" (which reserve a fraction of the min-
erals under the land described 5 2). The court of appeals refused to apply
this rule because of the reservation's unique language specifying lands
ccwhich are presently owned by Grantors. ' '5 3 If the clause modifies the
preceding words "the described lands," then the reservation operates to
reserve one-half of the total royalties. If the clause modifies "royalties to
be paid," then the reservation means that the grantors retained only one-
half of the royalty that they owned at the time of the conveyance. 54
To determine the clause's meaning, the court of appeals referred to the
basic rules of grammatical construction, including the doctrine of last an-
tecedent. 55 The restrictive dependent clause, "which are presently owned
by Grantors," would ordinarily refer to the last antecedent, "the de-
scribed lands," which would mean that the grantors win. But, the court of
appeals also refused to apply this rule. The court of appeals held that the
clause would be superfluous if it modified "the described lands" because
45. Ramirez, 2006 WL 927295, at *4 n.3; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 26.01(b)( 4)
(Vernon 2002).
46. Ramirez, 2006 WL 927295, at *4.
47. 192 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied).
48. Id. at 810.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 811.
51. See Hooks v. Neil, 21 S.W.2d 532, 538 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1929, writ
ref'd).
52. See King v. First Nat'l Bank of Wichita Falls, 192 S.W.2d 260, 262-63 (Tex. 1947).





the sentence would not change if the clause was removed. 56 The court of
appeals reasoned that it must find a reference that would make the clause
meaningful and that it could not ascribe a "futile" or "vain" purpose to
the agreement's words.57 Applying the clause to the phrase "one-half (1/
2) of the royalties" harmonizes and gives effect to every part of the agree-
ment. The court of appeals held that the clause refers to and defines
"one-half (1/2) of the royalties," and that the grantors reserved an inter-
est in one-half of the royalties that they owned when they conveyed the
lands. 58
The court of appeals effectively read the phrase, "which are presently
owned by Grantors," so as to convert a reservation of one-half of the
royalties from the lands described to one-half of the royalties from the
interest conveyed in the lands described.
In EOG Resources, Inc. v. Wagner & Brown, Ltd.,5 9 the Corpus Christi
Court of Appeals construed the meaning of a farmout agreement's depth
limitation, expressed as "the deepest producing interval as obtained in
the test well."'60 Farmor retained the deep rights under a provision in the
farmout agreement that provided:
The Assignment provided for above shall be limited in depth to 100
feet below the deepest producing interval as obtained in the test well,
shall be without warranty either express or implied and shall reserve
to Longhorn all rights below the assigned depths, together with such
rights as are necessary to Longhorn's full enjoyment of the reserved
deeper rights. 61
It was undisputed that the test well (Well #1) produced at depths between
9,679 and 9,729 feet, which was in the Morris Sand geologic formation.
The dispute arose when Well #2 produced from the Morris Sand at depths
between 10,230 and 10,266 feet. Farmor contended that it held the deep
rights below 9,829 feet; farmee contended that its interest followed the
formation to the deepest part, plus one-hundred feet.62
Farmee effectively claimed that the "producing interval" was the Mor-
ris Sand. The court of appeals disagreed and held that the qualifying lan-
guage "deepest producing interval as obtained in the test well" made it
clear that the depth limitation was fixed, not a variable depth.63 The
court of appeals noted that if they had intended to include the entire
Morris Sand as found under the property, the parties could have referred
to other readily available terms such as formation, horizon, field, reser-
voir, or stratigraphic layer.64
56. Id. at 812-13.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 813.
59. 202 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
60. Id. at 341.
61. Id. (emphasis added).
62. Id.
63. Id. (emphasis in opinion).
64. Id. at 345.
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The case highlights the significant property rights that may turn on a
few words used to express a depth limitation. A more common clause
used to reserve deep rights would reserve "all rights 100 feet below the
base of the Morris Sand formation as encountered at 9,729 feet beneath
the surface in the wellbore of the [well]."
In First Permian, L.L.C. v Graham,65 the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that a preferential right reserved by the holder of a production pay-
ment terminated when the production payment was fully paid. 66 Under
the assignment in question, the grantors conveyed certain oil and gas
leases for $500,000. Payment was in the form of $100,000 in cash and a
production payment of $400,000 plus interest. The reserved interest ter-
minated upon the final production payment. The assignment also con-
tained a preferential right to purchase the leases. Successors to assignor
and assignee contested whether or not the preferential right survived the
termination of the production payment. 67 The successor to assignor ar-
gued that the preferential right was a separate and independent covenant
that was not terminated by payout of the production payment. 68
The court of appeals disagreed and held that the preferential right was
intended to exist only so long as necessary to protect the interest of as-
signor, and assignor's successors, in the full payment for the lease.69 It
was uncontroverted that the preferential right in this case was a real cove-
nant. The preferential right terminated because (1) a real covenant en-
dures only so long as the interest in land to which it is appended and (2)
only owners of the land that the covenant was intended to benefit can
enforce it.70
In Glover v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.,71 the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals applied the doctrine of strips-and-gores and adverse possession to
determine title to the minerals in a railroad right-of-way. Campbell
owned a tract that straddled a railroad right-of-way, including the miner-
als beneath that right-of-way. Campbell executed separate deeds in 1904
conveying to others the acreage "north" and "south" of the railroad, but
the deeds were silent as to the railroad right-of-way itself. At issue in this
case was ownership of the six acres lying within the railroad right-of-way
south of the centerline ("Campbell Tract"). 72 Campbell's 1904 convey-
ance as to the tract south of the railroad ("Nettleton Tract") described
the lands conveyed by metes and bounds, and as "bounded on the N. by
the Right of way of the Texas & Pacific R.R. Co. . . .,73 Some of the
successor owners of undivided interests in the Nettleton Tract ("Claim-
65. 212 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, pet. denied).
66. Id. at 371-72.
67. Id. at 370.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 372-73.
70. Id. at 372.
71. 187 S.W.3d 201 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. denied).
72. Id. at 206-07.
73. Id. at 212 n.9.
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ants") claimed the minerals in the Campbell Tract. Those minerals had
been produced since 1931 by successor owners ("Defendants"), who
claimed under a separate chain of title that originated in a 1931 oil and
gas lease from Campbell's widow on the Campbell Tract.74 In 1932, the
railroad made an adverse possession claim, and the original oil company
lessee conveyed a one-half interest to the railroad. As a final additional
complication, there was also a 1932 quitclaim deed from the owner of a
one-eighth interest in the Nettleton Tract to Defendants. Based on the
quitclaim of the one-eighth interest, Claimants positioned themselves as
co-tenants with Defendants in the Nettleton Tract, which, according to
Claimants, included the Campbell Tract. Therefore, the general nature of
the suit as brought by Claimants was not in trespass to try title, but rather
for an accounting among co-tenants. 75 The court of appeals characterized
the case as concerning "royalty interests, '7 6 but Claimants were seeking a
share of production as an unleased co-tenant, not a share of royalty.
Claimants held record title to the centerline of the railroad. Because
Campbell's deed of the Nettleton Tract did not expressly reserve rights to
the minerals under the Campbell Tract (railroad right-of-way), those min-
erals passed to his grantee under the presumption that a deed conveys
land to the center of the right-of-way even when the deed describes the
abutting land as extending only to the edge of the right-of-way. 77 In fact,
in 1940, the Texas Supreme Court reaffirmed this principle in a decision
on Campbell's lands north of the railroad.78 The doctrine of strips and
gores "requires the strip (1) to be small in comparison to the land con-
veyed, (2) to be adjacent to or surrounded by the land conveyed, (3) to
belong to the grantor at the time of the conveyance, and (4) to be of
insignificant or little practical value."' 79 Defendants challenged on the
fourth element, but the court of appeals said that the right-of-way had
little value in 1904, before oil was discovered. Thus, Claimants held re-
cord title to the Campbell Tract.80
The court of appeals then held that the Claimants lost their title to
Defendants by adverse possession. 81 Because the widow Campbell, as
lessor, owned no minerals in the Campbell Tract, she and the original
lessee were naked trespassers. Thus, the widow Campbell, the original oil
company lessee, and the railroad were all naked trespassers. The oil com-
pany and the railroad then acquired the one-eighth quitclaim deed as to
the Campbell Tract from Nettleton, which made them co-tenants with
Claimants. Each co-tenant has the right to develop the minerals in the
tract, subject to a duty to account to the other co-tenants. Therefore, it is
74. Id. at 207.
75. Id. at 207 n.2, 210-11.
76. Id. at 211.
77. Id. at 212 (citing Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. Weed, 50 S.W.2d 1080 (1932)).
78. Glover, 187 S.W.3d at 212 nn.8-9, 219 n.22 (citing Cox v. Campbell, 143 S.W.2d 361
(1940)).
79. Id. at 212.
80. Id. at 212-13.
81. Id. at 213-14.
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usually harder to perfect title by adverse possession against co-tenants
because it is difficult to show that the production was "adverse." 82
Claimants first contended that Defendants could not meet their burden
of proving that they actually possessed the entire mineral estate because
none of the Defendants were claiming the entire interest in the Campbell
Tract. It is not clear, but, apparently, the court of appeals concluded that
the claim of the Defendants under the widow Campbell's lease was to the
entire mineral estate, regardless of the quitclaim of the one-eighth from
Nettleton.83
Claimants next contended that the possession was not adverse. Before
a co-tenant can begin to adversely posses the land, the co-tenant must
repudiate the tenancy. 84 But, actual notice is not required. 85 The court
of appeals said:
Such notice may be constructive and will be presumed to have been
brought home to the co-tenant or owner when the adverse occu-
pancy and claim of title to the property is so long-continued, open,
notorious, exclusive and inconsistent with the existence of title in
others, except the occupant, that the law will raise the inference of
notice to the co-tenant or owner out of possession, or from which a
jury might rightfully presume such notice. It is held that repudiation
of the claim of a co-tenant and notice thereof may be shown by cir-
cumstances and that a jury may infer such facts from long continued
possession of the land under claim of ownership and non-assertion of
claim by the owner. 86
The court of appeals had no trouble finding sufficient constructive notice
based on the Defendants' production and operations on the property for
almost seventy years. Therefore, under the ten-year statute of limita-
tions, Defendants perfected title by adverse possession.87
Because the 1904 Campbell deed of the Nettleton Tract did not clearly
cover the land to the center of the right-of-way, and because the widow
Campbell and her lessees "re-entered" by virtue of the oil and gas lease,
the court of appeals also held that estoppel by deed (grantor cannot claim
adversely against grantor's own deed) did not bar Defendant's from tak-
ing adversely. 88 Because either the two-year or four-year statute of limi-
tations applies to suits for an accounting by a co-tenant, limitations would
bar any claim for an accounting of production before Defendants ac-
quired title by adverse possession. 89
82. Id.
83. See id. at 214.
84. Id. at 215.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 215-16.
88. Id. at 216-17.
89. Id. at 219-20.
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III. LEASES AND LEASING
In Bargsley v. Pryor Petroleum Corp.,90 the Eastland Court of Appeals
strictly construed a sixty-day clause limited to "drilling" and held that
other "operations" will not preserve the lease. 91 The lease clause
provided:
If, at the expiration of the primary term of this lease, oil or gas is
not being produced on the leased premises, but lessee is then en-
gaged in drilling for oil or gas, then this lease shall continue in force
so long as drilling operations are being continuously prosecuted on
the leased premises; and drilling operations shall be considered to be
continuously prosecuted if not more than sixty (60) days shall elapse
between the completion or abandonment of one well and the begin-
ning of operations for the drilling of a subsequent well. If oil or gas
shall be discovered and produced from any such well or wells drilled
or being drilled at or after the expiration of the primary term of this
lease, this lease shall continue in force so long as oil or gas shall be
produced from the leased premises. 92
The lessee's activities included: long-stroking the existing oil well; laying
a pipeline; doing electrical work; installing, checking, and repairing flow
lines; replacing a tank; keeping the electricity on; and keeping the equip-
ment on the lease. "While these activities under certain circumstances
might be considered to be 'operations,' that is a question we do not ad-
dress, as these 'operations' are not 'drilling operations' as a matter of
law."93
The lease also provided:
In case of cancellation or termination of this lease for any cause,
lessee shall have the right to retain under the terms hereof twenty
(20) acres of land around each oil or gas well producing, being
worked on or drilling hereunder. 94
Lessee argued that the lease should not have been terminated as to the
twenty acres around each well that fell within this lease provision. The
court of appeals reversed and remanded the summary judgment on the
issue as to whether the oil well on the lease was "being worked on,"
which was a fact question.95
In Cartwright v. Cologne Production Co.,96 the Corpus Christi Court of
Appeals held that post-production costs are deductible proportionately
from the royalty interest under the lease and division order in question.97
The lessee, Cologne, ran the gas produced from the lease through gather-
ing lines, treatment facilities, and compressors, all located on the leased
90. 196 S.W.3d 823 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied).
91. Id. at 826-28.
92. Id. at 826.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 828.
95. Id.
96. 182 S.W.3d 438 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2006, pet. denied).
97. Id. at 444-46.
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premises. Compression was necessary to enter the sales pipeline. Co-
logne deducted the treating and compression costs proportionately from
the royalty share. 98 The court of appeals never quoted the royalty provi-
sion from the 1922 lease, but the applicable division order read:
In making settlements for the interests of the undersigned in said
proceeds, you are authorized to use the net proceeds received by you
at the wells when the gas is sold at the wells; but if sold or used off of
the premises, you are authorized to use the market value at the wells
of the gas so sold or used off of the premises, such market value at
the wells is in no event to exceed the net proceeds received by you
from such sale.99
The court of appeals relied on existing authority to describe the general
rule for the deduction of post-production costs:
Production costs are the expenses incurred in exploring for min-
eral substances and in bringing them to the surface. Absent an ex-
press term to the contrary, these costs are not chargeable to the non-
operating royalty interest. Whatever costs are incurred after produc-
tion of the gas or minerals are normally proportionately borne by
both the operator and the royalty interest owners. These post-pro-
duction costs include taxes, treatment costs to render the gas market-
able, compression costs to make it deliverable into a purchaser's
pipeline, and transportation costs. The parties may, however, modify
this general rule by agreement. 10 0
The court of appeals found the "royalty provision language" in this
case to be indistinguishable from the division order in Judice v.
Mewbourne Oil Co.,10 1 which held that "at the well" means before value
is added by preparing the gas for market."10 2 In Cartwright, the lessor
contended that the law applicable when the lease was executed should
govern at that time, and Pan American Petroleum Corp. v. Southland
Royalty Co.10 3 held that no costs were to be deducted from the royalty
share.10 4 The Cartwright court found Pan Am to be distinguishable be-
cause (1) the issue there was the deductibility of compression costs, (2)
compression in Pan Am was not necessary to enter the pipeline, and (3)
the Pan Am opinion merely held that there were "no properly deductible
items of expense. '10 5
Thus, notwithstanding some of the uncertainty that has existed as to
the deduction of post-production costs since the decision in Heritage Re-
sources v. NationsBank,10 6 the court of appeals in Cartwright unequivo-
98. Id. at 442-43.
99. Id. at 443.
100. Id. at 444-45 (citations omitted).
101. 939 S.W.2d 133 (Tex. 1966).
102. Id. at 137.
103. 396 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1965, writ dism'd).
104. Id. at 524-25.
105. Cartwright, 182 S.W.3d at 445.
106. 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996).
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cally re-asserted conventional wisdom on the deduction of post-
production costs.
In Chesapeake Operating, Inc. v. Denson,10 7 the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals construed a lease amendment affecting leases previously owned by
Texoma Natural Gas Company. Texoma acquired division orders that ex-
pressly amended the underlying lease and provided:
It is understood that at this time you are subject to and are paying
an occupation or production tax of two per cent (2%) of the market
value of gas produced and saved. If hereafter there shall be any in-
crease in the amount of said tax, or there shall be levied any new
occupation, production, severance or other excise tax, one-eighth (1/
8) of such increase shall be deducted from the above agreed royalty
value of the gas which is then applicable. 108
When the division order amendment was signed, the producer was obli-
gated, by statute, to pay the production tax. The production-tax statute
was later amended to obligate both producers and royalty-interest owners
to pay their pro-rata share of the tax. The issue was whether the pro-
ducer had the continuing obligation to pay all of the first two percent of
the tax, or whether the royalty owner's obligation to bear a proportionate
part extended to and included the first two percent. 10 9
The court of appeals held that the royalty owner was obligated to bear
a proportionate part of the tax only to the extent that it exceeded the
threshold of two percent.110 The court of appeals reasoned that the
amendment clearly provided that the sharing arrangement was only ap-
plicable to an increase in the tax, and subsequent statutory changes had
no effect on the pre-existing contractual arrangement."1
In Tana Oil and Gas Corp. v. Cernosek,11 2 the Austin Court of Appeals
determined a class action royalty-accounting case on processed gas
brought by lessors against their lessee under leases with several varieties
of "net proceeds" or "amount realized" royalty clauses. Lessee entered
into a field-wide gas purchase and processing ("POP") contract with the
gas processor in which lessee agreed to sell to the gas processor, at the
well, all gas produced from the class members' combined leases as well as
the right to process the gas.113 In exchange, the processor agreed to pay
lessee eighty-four percent of the combined monthly sales prices of the
natural gas liquids extracted from the raw gas and eighty-four percent of
the residue gas. The gas contract also obligated lessee to provide its pro-
portionate part of gas at no cost to the gas processor for plant fuel and
compression. Thus, this was an eighty-four percent POP contract on a
wellhead sale with pricing and volumes determined at the tailgate of the
107. 201 S.W. 3d 369 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, pet. denied).
108. Id. at 370.
109. Id. at 370-71.
110. Id. at 373.
111. Id. at 372.
112. 188 S.W.3d 354 (Tex. App.-Austin 2006, pet. denied).
113. Id. at 356.
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plant after deductions for line losses, fuel, and compression. A separate
contract reimbursed lessee for compression, and lessee added those re-
ceipts to the amount it received under the POP contract and accounted
on the total to its lessors for their royalty. 114 The lessor class contended
that they were entitled to royalties based on 100% of the gross metered
volumes of gas sold at the well (that is, they should be paid on 100%
POP, rather than 84% POP), that lessee should pay royalties on gas that
the processor consumed, and that lessee had improperly burdened the
royalty owners with downstream post-production costs. A judgment for
the class of approximately $3 million was reversed on appeal.' 15
Depending on the specific royalty provision in the applicable lease, the
lessee was generally obligated to pay a fractional share of either the
"amount realized" or "net proceeds" from its sale of gas at the well. The
term "amount realized" has been construed to mean the proceeds re-
ceived from the sale of the oil or gas. 116 The lessee sold the raw gas to the
processor at the well and received eighty-four percent of the resale price
of the residue gas and extracted liquids after treatment. The class mem-
bers argued that, since lessee was obligated to pay royalties on one-hun-
dred percent of the total volume of gas sold at the well, they were entitled
to royalties on the additional sixteen percent of the proceeds from the
sale of the residue gas and the extracted liquids after processing, regard-
less of the fact that lessee did not receive, and was not owed, this portion
of the post-processing sales proceeds under the contract.1 17
The court of appeals found that the sale of raw gas at the well was
separate and distinct from the third-party sales of the residue gas and
extracted liquids on the open market.1 18 Lessee did not sell the residue
gas or the liquids; lessee sold raw gas at the well before any value was
added by preparing the gas for market. Therefore, "[t]his pricing formula
represents the negotiated value of the raw gas." 119 Lessee did not receive
one-hundred percent of all of the proceeds from the sales of the residue
gas and the liquids. Instead, lessee received only eighty-four percent of
all of the proceeds from the sales of the residue gas and the liquids. By
paying the class-member lessors royalties on one-hundred percent of the
money lessee actually received, lessee ultimately paid royalties on one-
hundred percent of the total volume of raw gas sold at the well. Because
lessee paid royalties based on the proceeds received, the court of appeals
held that lessee did not breach the leases owned by the class members.12 0
The court of appeals also held that the leases permitted the deduction
of reasonable post-production costs. 12 1 The class members argued that it
114. Id. at 357 n.4, 361 n.6.
115. Id. at 358-59.




120. Id. at 360-61.
121. Id. at 362.
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was improper for lessee to deduct the compression and treating costs
from the sales of the raw gas that lessee sold at the well. The court of
appeals again stated that lessee was required to pay royalties on either
the amount that it realized or its net proceeds from the gas at the well. 122
The Texas Supreme Court has stated that the term "net proceeds" ex-
pressly contemplates deductions, while the phrase "at the well" means
before value is added by preparing the gas for market. 123 Therefore, the
plain language of the applicable royalty clauses acknowledged that de-
ductions may be necessary to determine the value of gas at the well. The
post-production costs added value to the raw gas sold by lessee, and, if
these costs are not deducted, then the class members' royalties would be
based on the proceeds that lessee received from the sale of the raw gas,
plus the costs incurred to prepare the gas for sale on the open market. 124
Thus, lessee's net proceeds cannot be determined unless post-production
costs are deducted, and no royalty is due on post-production expenses.1 25
Similarly, the court of appeals also found that lessee did not breach the
leases by failing to pay royalties on gas that the processor consumed.1 26
"We do not know, nor is it relevant, why [lessee] agreed to these terms.
Our only concern is whether [lessee] fully complied with its obligations as
stated in the lease agreements."' 127 Under the lease, lessee was to pay the
class members royalties on the net proceeds that it actually received from
the sale of raw gas at the well.1 28
The case clearly and firmly stands for the principle that the price paya-
ble for royalty purposes on a wellhead sale of gas may be determined by
reference to a downstream point of sale and be contingent upon the price
received at that point, that is, a classic POP contract. Under a "proceeds"
lease, lessee must pay royalty on the full amount received by lessee, net
of reasonable and necessary post-production costs. This was a summary
judgment case, so no issues were presented on the reasonableness of such
fees, nor were there any issues about affiliate sales.
In ConocoPhillips Co. v. Ramirez,129 the San Antonio Court of Ap-
peals distinguished between statewide rules and field rules in the context
of construing the application of a Pugh-type clause. The specific lease
clause in this case provided:
At the end of five years after the expiration of the primary term
hereof, Lessee covenants and agrees to execute and deliver to Lessor
a written release of any and all portions of this lease which have not
been drilled to a density of at least forty (40) acres for each produc-
122. Id. at 361.
123. Id. at 360 (citing Judice v. Mewbourne Oil Co., 939 S.W.3d 133, 137 (Tex. 1996)).
124. Id.
125. Id. at 361-62.
126. Id. at 362.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. No. 04-05-00488-CV, 2006 WL 1748584 (Tex. App.-San Antonio June 28, 2006,
no pet.).
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ing oil well and three hundred and twenty (320) acres for each pro-
ducing or shut-in gas well from depths above 5,000 feet from the
surface of the ground and 640 acres for each producing or shut-in gas
well from depths below 5,000 feet from the surface of the ground
except that in case any rule adopted by the Railroad Commission of
Texas or other regulating authority for any field on this lease pro-
vides for a spacing or proration establishing different units of acre-
age per well, then such established different units shall be held under
this lease by such production, in lieu of the units above mentioned.
The lessor argued that the Texas Railroad Commission adopted two
rules-statewide Rules 37 and 38. In other words, lessor argued that the
well in question held only forty acres, rather than 640 acres. 130 Many
leases have similar clauses, so the ruling in this case is very significant.
The court of appeals held that statewide Rules 37 and 38 apply to the
field in which the gas well was drilled, but those rules were not adopted
for this field.131 Therefore, ConocoPhillips was entitled to hold 640 acres
surrounding the gas well.132 The court of appeals principally relied upon
the procedural differences in establishing statewide and field rules as a
basis for its holding.1 33 However, a more compelling reason is that to
rule otherwise would make the clause meaningless. Statewide rules ex-
isted when the lease was executed, and, if they were to apply, the state-
wide rules would always trump the larger units specified in the lease,
rendering that part of the clause meaningless. 134
In Wagner & Brown Ltd. v. Sheppard,135 the Texarkana Court of Ap-
peals analyzed the rights of lessor and lessee under a terminated well-site
lease in a pooled unit. Lessor owned a one-eighth interest in a 62.72-acre
tract included in a pooled unit of 122 acres. Lessee pooled the lease, and
drilled the Landers No. 1 on the lease as a producer. The lease termi-
nated on March 1, 1997, and lessee then drilled the Landers No. 2 on the
lease as a producer. It was undisputed that the lease terminated on
March 1, 1997, and that the parties were thereafter co-tenants. At issue
was the allocation of production, recoupment of historic costs, and re-
coupment of future costs. 136
Lessee contended that the pooling agreement was still in effect and
that lessee should account to lessor as a co-tenant (rather then as a roy-
alty owner) but on a pooled-tract basis (one-eighth of 62.72/122). Lessor
contended that the lease terminated; therefore, the pooling agreement as
to lessor terminated, and lessee should account to lessor as a co-tenant
(rather than as a royalty owner), but on a tract basis (one-eighth). The
issue was whether, after termination of the lease, lessor's mineral interest
130. Id. at *1.
131. Id. at *2.
132. Id. at *3.
133. Id. at *2.
134. Id. at *3.
135. 198 S.W.3d 369 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. filed).
136. Id. at 372-73.
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was still subject to the pooled unit. A pooling is ordinarily a cross-con-
veyance of real property interests, which means that all parties share in
proportion to their contribution to the pool.137 The court of appeals in
this case concluded that it did not have to analyze the consequences of
unscrambling a cross-conveyance of real property interests because the
lease in this case contained specific language that the pooling by the
lessee would not result in a cross-conveyance among the participants in
the pool. 138 The division of royalty payments was dictated by the lease,
not by underlying real property concepts. 139 Therefore, the lease was a
transfer of an interest in realty to the lessee, but the pooling was not a
transfer of an interest in realty to the other participants in the pool. The
lease created a determinable fee, it terminated, lessee could pool no more
than lessee owned, and lessee only had an ownership interest until the
lease terminated. Moreover, the "pooling agreement" in this case trans-
ferred "only lessee's interest-a determinable fee-that ceased when the
lease terminated."'140 Therefore, the pooling was no longer effective as to
the interest of lessor under the terminated lease.' 4 ' The opinion does not
address whether the pooling is still effective as to the other participants in
the pool.
The Landers No. 1 was drilled and completed as a producer before
lease termination. A lessor has no liability for costs that the lessee incurs.
After the lease terminated, lessor, as an unleased co-tenant, was obli-
gated to bear lessor's share of costs and expenses before sharing in any
revenues. The court of appeals held that lessee could recoup one-eighth
of costs incurred after lease termination, but lessee could not recoup for
any costs incurred before lease termination. 42
Lessee also attempted to deduct certain expenses generally described
as "leasehold, land-legal, and overhead expenses," which the trial court
denied. The court of appeals agreed on procedural and evidentiary
grounds but commented on the limited right of recovery.' 4 3 Certain
types of expenses are recoverable from co-tenants, but those expenses
must be reasonable and necessary, and they must benefit the co-ten-
ancy. 144 In the oil and gas 'context, the Texas Supreme Court has held
that the extracting tenant must account for the value of the minerals
taken, less the necessary and reasonable costs of production and market-
ing.145 Lessee cannot deduct for unsuccessful reworking operations or
for dry holes. 146
137. Id. at 374-76 (citing the leading cases Montgomery v. Rittersbacher, 424 S.W.2d
210, 213 (Tex. 1968), Brown v. Smith, 174 S.W.2d 43, 46 (1943)).
138. Wagner & Brown Ltd., 198 S.W.3d at 376.
139. Id. at 376 n.5.
140. Id. at 377.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 378.
144. Id. at 379.
145. See Byrom v. Pendley, 717 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tex. 1986).
146. Wagner & Brown Ltd., 198 S.W.3d at 378.
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Lessee had performed a workover on the Landers No. 1, which cost
$592,000 and generated $10,000 in revenue over two years. Lessee con-
tended that it should be able to recoup or deduct reasonable and neces-
sary expenses on a tract basis rather than well-by-well. The court of
appeals found no precedent directly on point, but all prior cases generally
spoke to recoupment as to wells rather than as to a tract. Therefore, the
court of appeals concluded that the recoupment rules applied to work on
individual wells, not to the tract in general. 147 The court of appeals also
said that lessee could not recover because the failed re-entry was of no
benefit to the co-tenancy. 148
The case is significant because it addressed in some detail the issues
remaining between lessor and lessee on a terminated-but-producing well-
site lease included in a pooled unit. The opinion avoids an analysis of the
basic concept of a cross-conveyance of realty and the effect on that cross-
conveyance of a lease termination. The case also does not address the
rights and obligations of the other participants in the pool.
IV. OPERATING AGREEMENTS AND OPERATIONS
In Seagull Energy E & P, Inc. v. Eland Energy, Inc.,149 the Texas Su-
preme Court determined whether the sale of a non-operating working
interest that is subject to an operating agreement releases the seller from
its obligations to the operator under the operating agreement. Seagull, as
operator, sued Eland as non-operator, and its assignee, Nor-Tex, when
Nor-Tex failed to pay certain joint-interest billings. Eland refused to pay
because it no longer owned an interest in the leases. The trial court
awarded judgment to Seagull on summary judgment against Eland and
Nor-Tex, jointly and severally, for more than $268,000, plus interest and
attorney's fees. Eland appealed.1 50
The supreme court reviewed several provisions in the operating agree-
ments and found that none of them explicitly provided what would hap-
pen when there was an assignment of a working interest to a third
party.15 1 As a general rule, a party who assigns its contractual rights and
duties to a third party will remain liable unless the other contracting party
expressly or impliedly releases them. Because the operating agreement
did not expressly provide that Eland's obligations would terminate upon
assignment of the agreement and because Seagull did not expressly re-
lease Eland from liability following the assignment of its working interest,
the supreme court held in favor of Seagull. 152
In Duke Energy Field Services v. Meyer,153 the Amarillo Court of Ap-
peals reversed a jury verdict for damages to cattle caused by a pipeline
147. Id. at 380.
148. Id.
149. 207 S.W.3d 342 (Tex. 2006).
150. Id. at 344-45.
151. Id. at 345-46.
152. Id. at 347.
153. 190 S.W.3d 149 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, pet. denied).
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leak.154 The pipeline easement provided that the pipeline company
would "pay [landowner] for any other or additional damages to growing
crops, grass, fences, improvements, and livestock which may result of the
exercise of the rights" granted in the easement.155
Meyer, who had forty-five cows on the land, went to his pasture where
he saw his cows standing in a black-green oily product. He saw them lick-
ing and rubbing their noses in it. One cow aborted the next day, and,
over a period of time, thirty cows aborted or had dead calves. The next
year, seventeen of the thirty-nine remaining cows were barren or had
calves that died.156
The court of appeals found that the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the finding of causation, even though Duke argued that expert
testimony was necessary to establish causation, because Duke failed to
object to the testimony.' 57 But the court of appeals found the evidence to
be factually insufficient to support the finding of causation because sev-
eral other conditions or events could have caused the cows to abort, and
there was no evidence to show that one was more probable than the
other. 158 The case highlights the proof required in a case involving oil
spills and injury to livestock.
In Stephens v. Finley Resources, Inc.,159 the Amarillo Court of Appeals
held that a saltwater-disposal agreement granting lessee authority to dis-
pose of saltwater from off-lease wells on the leased premises did not af-
fect or limit lessee's implied and express rights under the lease to dispose
of saltwater from lease wells on the leased premises.1 60 The oil and gas
lease was executed in 1945. In 1984, lessor and lessee agreed to allow the
lessee to use a lease well as a disposal point for salt water from off-lease
wells in exchange for a rental payment to lessor.16 1 Lessee later cancelled
the agreement, stopped paying the rental, but continued to inject lease
water into the well.162
The court of appeals relied on existing authority to reject lessor's claim
that the 1984 agreement limited Finley's rights to dispose of saltwater. A
lessee has an implied right to dispose of saltwater produced from lease
wells in conjunction with performing its contractual obligations and may
do so by injecting it into an oil and gas well on the leased premises, as-
suming that the lease does not expressly provide otherwise.1 63 Lessee
had the "right to use so much of the land as was reasonably necessary in
the production of oil and since the production of oil necessarily involved
154. Id. at 154.
155. Id. at 151.
156. Id. at 151-53.
157. Id. at 153.
158. Id. at 154.
159. No. 07-05-0023-CV, 2006 WL 768877 (Tex. App.-Amarillo Mar. 27, 2006, no
pet.).
160. Id. at *1-3.
161. Id. at *1-2.
162. Id. at *1.
163. Id.
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its separation from salt water, [lessee] would have the right, ordinarily
under the implied terms of the lease, to use the land for that purpose
"164
Lessor did not challenge the underlying implied or express right that
the lease granted, but contended that the 1984 agreement supplemented
that right, relying on specific language in the agreement.165 The court of
appeals rejected that argument because the 1984 agreement did not men-
tion the mineral lease, nor did it expressly state that the agreement was
intended to negate or limit the rights given to the lessee under the min-
eral lease. 166 The court of appeals did place special emphasis on the lease
clause granting lessee water rights, which provided that "lessee has the
right to use water from said land, except water from lessor's wells, for all
operations ... including repressuring, pressure maintenance and recycling
"167
The court of appeals held that, once the 1984 agreement terminated,
lessee no longer had the right to use the lease well for disposal of off-
lease saltwater; however, lessee's right to dispose of saltwater from lease
wells was still in effect. 168
Lessors and lessees frequently enter into agreements ancillary to oper-
ations on the lease to address matters not covered by the lease or to clar-
ify, expand, or limit rights and obligations related to the lease. This case
illustrates the inherent risk that such an agreement may be construed to
conflict with express or implied lease terms. This suggests that the drafts-
man should consider when and how to use concepts such as: "In addition
to the other terms and conditions of the lease ... ;" "Except as expressly
limited herein, the lease is ratified and confirmed as fully in force and
effect ... ;" "Without limiting the rights granted to lessee under the lease,
lessor and lessee agree that lessee will ... ;" or "Notwithstanding para-
graph - of the lease . .. ."
In Texas Genco, LP v. Valence Operating Co.,169 the Waco Court of
Appeals discussed the accommodation doctrine and approved -a broad-
form jury question on the reasonableness of directional drilling. In the
case, a surface owner sued to enjoin the mineral owner from straight-hole
drilling a gas well on a tract that was a part of the surface owner's ash-
disposal landfill for its nearby electrical power generation plant. The
tract in question was part of a landfill approved by the Texas Commission
on Environmental Quality, and there was ample evidence of the unique
use and the serious consequences for the surface owner of drilling in the
landfill. Surface owner offered the mineral owner compensation for the
additional cost of directional drilling and a corridor to drill just outside
the landfill. Negotiations failed, the mineral owner began constructing a
164. Brown v. Lundell, 162 Tex. 84, 92 (Tex. 1961).
165. Stephens, 2006 WL 768877, at *1.
166. Id. at *2.
167. Id. at *1.
168. Id. at *2.
169. 187 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).
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pad, the surface owner obtained a temporary injunction, and trial pro-
ceeded on the surface owner's suit for a permanent injunction and the
mineral owner's counterclaim for damages. The trial court submitted
three questions rather than a broad-form submission and, based on the
jury's answers, denied the permanent injunction and awarded mineral
owner $400,000 in damages. The court of appeals reversed. 170
In Texas, the dominant mineral estate has the right to reasonable use of
the surface estate to produce minerals, but the right must be exercised
with due regard for the rights of the surface estate owner. The accommo-
dation doctrine takes the concept of "due regard" and balances the rights
of the surface and mineral owners in the use of the surface. 171 The court
of appeals relied heavily on its previous experience in Haupt I and Haupt
II, and it discussed in detail the accommodation doctrine, the elements,
the burden of proof, and the form of submission:
Where there is an existing use by the surface owner which would
otherwise be precluded or impaired, and where under the estab-
lished practices in the industry there are alternatives available to the
[mineral owner] whereby the minerals can be recovered, the rules of
reasonable usage of the surface may require the adoption of an alter-
native by the [mineral owner]172
The mineral estate is the dominant estate, and if there is but one way to
produce the minerals, the mineral owner has the right to pursue his use.
The court of appeals emphasized, though, that if there is another way to
produce the minerals, the mineral owner may be required to use it.
1 7 3
The surface owner has the burden of proof on all the elements and the
burden of obtaining the findings necessary to carry that burden. In order
to prove that the mineral owner should use the alternative-industry prac-
tice, the surface owner must first show "that any alternative uses of the
surface, other than the existing use, are impracticable and unreasonable
under all the circumstances. '174 The surface owner must next show that
the challenged mineral owner's surface use is not reasonably necessary to
the mineral owner under all circumstances. This may be done by proving
that the mineral owner has other reasonable means of production availa-
ble that will not interfere with the surface owner's existing use.
17 5
The case was submitted on three questions that the court of appeals
disapproved, stating that the trial court should have submitted a broad-
170. Id. at 120-21.
171. Id. at 121-22 (citing the leading cases of Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 613
(Tex. 1971) ("Getty"), Tarrant County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v.
Haupt, Inc., 854 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1993) ("Haupt I"), and Haupt, Inc. v. Tarrant County
Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1, 870 S.W.2d 350 (Tex. App.-Waco 1944, no
writ) ("Haupt I")).
172. Texas Genco, 187 S.W.3d at 121-22 (quoting both Haupt I and Getty) (emphasis
added).
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form charge. 176 The court of appeals ruled on the effect of the jury find-
ing as a legal question under a de novo standard of review. The opinion's
entire focus was on the court's analysis of that verdict and its conclusion
that there was sufficient evidence and an adequate finding to satisfy the
second element: the mineral owner had other reasonable means of pro-
duction available that would not interfere with the surface owner's ex-
isting use.177 The mineral owner argued that the surface owner failed to
submit or secure a finding on the first element (any alternative use is
impractical), and, therefore, it should be deemed found against the sur-
face owner. The court of appeals held that there was no fact issue, it was
not contested at trial, and the evidence conclusively established that the
surface owner's only reasonable use of the tract was as a part of the land-
fill.178 Therefore, although this case went against the mineral owner on
difficult facts and a procedural issue, it appears that in most cases the
surface owner could have a difficult time proving that "any alternative
uses of the surface, other than the existing use, are impracticable and
unreasonable under all the circumstances." 179
Because a directional well is almost always a theoretical alternative
(but with increased risk, time, and expense), there has been speculation
as to whether a directional well would be a reasonable alternative (as
contemplated by Jones, Haupt I, and Haupt II) and as to who would bear
the increased burden. Apparently, under Texas Genco, the mineral
owner is required to bear the entire burden and risk. The court of appeals
held that directional drilling is a reasonable, industry-established, alterna-
tive method to gain access, and there was a jury finding that it was a
"reasonable" alternative.1 80 The opinion says:
On the issue of the reasonableness of directional drilling as an eco-
nomically viable alternative, which Valence disputed because of the
increased cost and alleged decreased yield, Genco presented evi-
dence that Valence's cost estimates were too high and that Valence
could extract all of the gas. Moreover, the evidence showed that re-
gardless of the costs and decreased yield, the projected $15 to $25
million in gas reserves in Holmes No. 8 warrant Valence's directional
drilling, regardless of the increased costs. In conclusion, legally suffi-
cient evidence supports the jury's answers to Questions I and 1(a).1 1l
If the mineral estate is truly the dominant estate, it would seem more
logical that the surface owner must compensate the mineral owner in
damages for forcing the alternative use. Texas Genco will encourage
every surface owner to litigate because they have nothing to lose except
litigation costs, and they might get lucky on a jury finding of a "reasona-
ble" alternative. The mineral owner has always been at risk in damages
176. Id. at 123 n.2.
177. Id. at 124-25.
178. Id. at 124 n.5.
179. Id. at 123.
180. Id. at 123-25.
181. Id. at 125.
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for excessive or unreasonable surface use, but, apparently, the surface
owner who establishes an existing use gets a free pass. However, if the
surface owner must first prove "that any alternative uses of the surface,
other than the existing use, are impracticable and unreasonable under all
the circumstances," then it should be a rare occurrence for a surface
owner to force an alternative surface use by the mineral owner.
In Devon Energy Production v. Hockley County Appraisal District,182
the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a county appraisal district can
assess for ad valorem taxation only for that portion of a producing forma-
tion within the county. 18 3 In this case, the lease was located (eighty-four
percent) in Hockley County and (sixteen percent) in Terry County. The
smaller producing formation, the Clearfork Formation, was located (fifty
percent) in Hockley County and (fifty percent) in Terry County. Terry
County assessed tax on fifty percent of the value of the Clearfork. In-
stead of using the geographic boundaries of the Clearfork as determina-
tive, Hockley County began with the boundaries of Devon's lease and
assessed tax based on the surface acres of the lease located in Hockley
County. Combining the assessments, the Clearfork was effectively valued
for tax purposes at 134% of its fair market value. 184 The court of appeals
held that no property can be assessed for ad valorem taxes at a greater
value than its fair cash market value, that the taxes must be assessed and
paid in the county where the property is situated, and an appraisal district
may only assess property within its district (which in this instance was
limited to Hockley County). 185 The burden of proving the property's lo-
cation is on the taxing unit.186
V. GAS CONTRACTS AND MARKETING
In ConocoPhillips Co. v. Incline Energy, Inc.,187 the Eastland Court of
Appeals held that Buyer under a gas-purchase agreement was not re-
quired to account to Seller for the sale of natural gas liquids ("NGLs"). 88
The pricing clause provided:
Subject to all terms, conditions and provisions of the Agreement, for
the period beginning on the effective date hereunder and extending
for the Term hereof, the price per MMBTU to be paid by Buyer to
Seller each month shall be eighty percent (80%) of the price(s)
which Buyer receives under its Resale Agreement(s) for all gas pur-
chased and sold hereunder at the Point(s) of delivery, such gas pro-
duced from the subject lands and leases.189
182. 178 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2006, pet. denied).
183. Id. at 882-83.
184. Id. at 880-81.
185. Id. at 882.
186. Id. at 883.
187. 189 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2006, pet. denied).
188. Id. at 382.
189. Id. at 379.
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Buyer based its payment to Seller on the weighted average residue-gas
price applied to the full-volume and heating value ("MMBTU") at the
point of delivery into the Buyer's pipeline. Seller contended that it
should also be paid on processed NGLs in addition to residue gas. 190
The court of appeals held that Buyer was correctly paying for the gas
and the "resale" of gas would exclude NGLs that were removed before
the first gas resale. 191 In reversing the trial court's finding that the con-
tract was ambiguous and its entry of a judgment for Seller, the court of
appeals refused to find either a patent or latent ambiguity in the contract.
When the gas purchase agreement and the subsequent amendment were
executed, the Natural Gas Policy Act ("NGPA") of 1978 was in effect.
Under the NGPA, the sale would have been a "first sale," and the
Buyer's subsequent sale to a third party would be a "resale." Resales
based upon residue gas were always expressed in terms of MMBTUs, and
sales of NGLs were always stated in terms of gallons. Therefore, the
court of appeals found that the contract could be given a definite and
certain meaning, so it was not patently ambiguous. 192
The court of appeals summarily rejected the trial court's finding of a
latent ambiguity. Latent ambiguities only arise when a contract fails by
reason of some collateral matter that is applied to the contract's subject
matter. Here, the alleged ambiguity did not arise out of some collateral
matter, but rather, out of the "very heart and essence of the agreement:
the pricing mechanism."'1 93
VI. LITIGATION
In Ruiz v. Stewart Mineral Corp.,194 the Tyler Court of Appeals dis-
cussed the applicability of a declaratory judgment action to establish title
by adverse possession and deed construction. B.S. and Daisy Wettermark
owned an undivided one-half mineral interest in certain land, and they
executed a power of attorney in favor of Witherspoon. B.S. Wettermark
died in 1935, and in 1938 Witherspoon executed a deed by which he pur-
ported to convey, as attorney-in-fact, the one-half undivided interest
owned by both B.S. and Daisy to grantees.195
Grantees continuously developed the undivided one-half mineral inter-
est from 1949 to 2003. In their original petition, grantees sought only a
declaratory judgment that they owned the undivided one-half interest
formerly owned by the Wettermarks. They claimed that the 1938 deed by
Witherspoon as attorney-in-fact was valid to convey the mineral interest
of Daisy Wettermark, but, regardless of the deed's validity, grantees
claimed that they were the rightful owners of Daisy's interest and B.S.
190. Id. at 379-80.
191. Id. at 382.
192. Id. at 381.
193. Id.
194. 202 S.W.3d 242 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2006, pet. denied).
195. Id. at 245.
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Wettermark's interest by adverse possession under the five-year and ten-
year adverse-possession statutes. 196
The successors to the Wettermarks ("Defendants") claimed that a tres-
pass-to-try title action is the statutory form of action required and the
exclusive remedy for determination of title.197 A trespass-to-try title ac-
tion is a procedure by which rival claims to title or right of possession
may be adjudicated.198 In a trespass-to-try title action, the plaintiff may
recover by proving a regular chain of conveyances from the sovereign, a
superior title out of a common source, title by limitations, or prior posses-
sion that has not been abandoned. 199 Adverse possession is defined as
"an actual and visible appropriation of real property, commenced and
continued from a claim of right that is inconsistent with and is hostile to
the claim of another person.200 The court of appeals held that, based on
the pleadings and evidence, this was an adverse possession case, and, as
such, the claim could only be resolved in a statutory trespass-to-try title
action.201 This is also the holding in the leading case of Martin, which the
grantees attempted to distinguish because Martin was a boundary case.
The court of appeals refused to make that distinction. The court of ap-
peals also declined to follow other appellate decisions rendered before
Martin, holding that title could be resolved on an adverse-possession
claim in a suit to quiet title. 202 Because the court of appeals held that a
declaratory judgment action was not the appropriate vehicle for resolving
adverse-possession claims, it reversed summary judgment on those
grounds.203
The parties agreed that Witherspoon could not act on behalf of B.S.
Wettermark after his death in 1935, but grantees also sought a declaration
that the 1938 deed was effective to convey Daisy's one-fourth of the min-
erals. Because Defendants challenged the validity of the acknowledg-
ment, the court of appeals reviewed the document in which Witherspoon
was given the authority to act as attorney-in-fact. The court of appeals
found that a notary public properly acknowledged it, and therefore an
effective deed as to Daisy's interest existed.204
The Declaratory Judgments Act provides that:
A person interested under a deed, will, written contract, or other
writings constituting a contract or whose rights, status, or other legal
relations are affected by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract, or
franchise may have determined any question of construction or va-
lidity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, contract, or
196. Id.; TEx. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.025 and § 16.026 (Vernon 2002).
197. Ruiz, 202 S.W.3d at 246-47.
198. Ruiz, 202 S.W.3d at 247 (citing King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742 (Tex.
2003)).
199. Id. (citing Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 884 S.W.2d 763 (Tex. 1994)).
200. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.021(1) (Vernon 2002).
201. Ruiz, 202 S.W.3d at 247; Martin v. Amerman, 133 S.W.3d 262, 267 (Tex. 2004).
202. Ruiz, 202 S.W.3d at 247-48.
203. Id. at 250.
204. Id. at 248.
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franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status, or other legal re-
lations thereunder.20 5
Therefore, the trial court's summary judgment as to Daisy's one-fourth of
the minerals was affirmed because the judgment properly declared that
her interest passed to the grantees under the 1938 deed.206
The trial court had awarded over $57,000 in attorney's fees, but the
court of appeals held that attorney's fees in this case could not have been
awarded on the adverse-possession claim.20 7 And, although attorney's
fees could be awarded under the Declaratory Judgments Act, the fees as
to each claim would have to be segregated. "An award of attorney's fees
erroneously based upon evidence of unsegregated fees requires a
remand." 208
In Vial v. Gas Solutions, Ltd.,20 9 the Texarkana Court of Appeals deter-
mined whether the heirs to an allegedly defrauded party have standing to
bring suit and whether fraudulent concealment tolls the statute of limita-
tions. Vial contended that its predecessor was fraudulently induced to
sign a well-spacing agreement with Gas Solutions' predecessors in 1931.
In the agreement, all parties agreed not to drill any additional wells. The
agreement contained the following recital, which is the basis of this law-
suit: "WHEREAS, the above tract of land adjoins on the south the right
of way of the Texas & Pacific Railroad which right of way is under lease
for oil and gas purposes to Gregg Oil Company. '210 Vial alleged that
there was no lease on the right-of-way, the recital misled Vial's predeces-
sor into believing that Gregg Oil Company had a valid lease on the right-
of-way, and the false representation fraudulently induced Vial's predeces-
sor to enter into the well-spacing agreement.211
Gas Solutions first challenged Vial's standing to sue because the gen-
eral rule is that a party lacks standing to sue for damage to property if an
injury to the property occurs before the plaintiff purchases the property.
In other words, the right to sue belongs to the predecessor in title, and, if
it is not expressly conveyed, then the subsequent purchaser has no cause
of action. In this case, Vial was not a subsequent purchaser of the prop-
erty, but, rather, heir to the predecessor in title. 21 2 Moreover, the suit
was not for damages to property, but for fraud. A fraud claim is personal
to the defrauded party, but the heirs of the defrauded party have standing
to sue to recover for the fraud. Therefore, Vial had standing to bring suit
as heir to the injured party.21 3 Similarly, the fact that the right-of-way
may have been adversely possessed later had no relevance to Vial's claim
205. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.004(a) (Vernon 1997).
206. Ruiz, 202 S.W.3d at 250.
207. Id. at 249-50.
208. Id.
209. 187 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.).
210. Id. at 226.
211. Id. at 224-25.
212. Id. at 225-27.
213. Id. at 227.
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for fraud in connection with the 1931 well-spacing agreement.214
The four-year statute of limitations is applicable to claims based on
fraud, and, therefore, Vial's claim was clearly barred unless the statute
was tolled. Vial contended that the statute of limitations was tolled by
Gas Solutions' fraudulent concealment of the fraudulent inducement.
Fraudulent concealment is an equitable defense to limitations that estops
the defendant from relying on the statute of limitations. Fraudulent con-
cealment tolls the statute of limitations until the plaintiff, using reasona-
ble diligence, discovers or should have discovered the injury.215
The court of appeals held that, even if a fact issue existed concerning
the underlying tort, i.e., whether some misleading recital or some subse-
quent conduct or document created a duty to disclose, Vial did not raise a
fact issue concerning fraudulent concealment.21 6 Fraudulent concealment
requires that the defendant have actual knowledge that a wrong has oc-
curred and that there was a "fixed purpose to conceal the facts necessary
for the plaintiff to know that it has a cause of action. '217 Vial did not
present any evidence that Gas Solutions' predecessors intended to con-
ceal the cause of action from Vial. There was just confusion about who
owned the right-of-way. 218
The court of appeals also found that Vial or Vial's predecessors should
have discovered their alleged injury concerning the land years ago. 219
Mineral interest owners have an obligation to exercise due diligence to
protect their interests. The doctrine of fraudulent concealment only tolls
the statute of limitations until the plaintiffs, using reasonable diligence,
discover or should have discovered the cause of action. Gas Solutions
and their predecessors had been openly extracting oil and gas from the
land covered by the lease since the 1930s. The wells were clearly visible,
and there was no evidence that Gas Solutions or its predecessors con-
ducted their activities in a clandestine manner.220 Because the alleged
fraud occurred more than seventy years ago, and the statute of limitations
had not been tolled, the court of appeals found that the four-year statute
of limitations barred Vial's claim to bring sUit.221
214. Id. at 228.
215. Id. at 228-29.
216. Id. at 230.
217. Id. at 230-31 (quoting Santanna Natural Gas Corp. v. Hamon Operating Co., 954
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. App.-Austin 1997, pet. denied)).
218. Id. at 231.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Id. at 232.
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